NZ housing allowance is a dualist regime having a cash subsidy known as the Accommodation Supplement (AS) and a stock of social housing in the rental market. Apart from State housing tenants, it is not easy to identify if a potential tenant is receiving any (housing) subsidy. I show that NZ housing LR equilibrium data for the previous century tells a story of consistent fundamentals shaping the sector. I then point to the emergence of financialised residential capitalism which begins to appear in the data post 1990 reforms via a structural shift. I witness disequilibrium in the housing markets which is better explained by bank behaviour than fundamentals, possibly assisting commodification of housing in NZ. Bank behaviour towards credit lending for housing needs appears as a fundamental determinant for modelling to avoid omitted variable bias. This helps to better understand asset price (house) inflation which I call “affordability inflation”. Theory and data present robust indications how housing markets disrupt rental markets. Ripples into the NZ rental markets are also witnessed. My analysis leans towards an idea of (a sort of) ‘institutional transformation’ being set in place leading to a growing private rental sector, and NZ losing its traditional role of a home owning democracy. In effect, I show that ‘velocity of tenure shift’ is on the rise in NZ, with rapid mortgage-debt led accumulation tipping in favour of investment property instead of home ownership. Housing cash subsidy results in increased disposable / residual incomes. Although, this argument lends support to the tool but says nothing about its efficiency, which lies solely in its structural formation. The case for ‘landlord capture’ and ‘fiscal blowout’ are examined. Comparative analysis of the dual housing regime is deconstructed in its detail towards interesting revelations. In case of AS, the picture almost suggests a ceiling mechanism at work within the complex layers of the subsidy, in effect, comfortably managing any risk of a ‘fiscal blowout’ under the subsidy’s conditions at present. Alternatively, social housing results in ‘perfect landlord capture’ – when mkt rents increase, change in subsidy goes to the landlord (i.e. Crown). It is argued that rapid financialised residential capitalism and the resulting institutional shift require serious attention. I explain that NZ is an outlier in the typologies for the varieties of residential capitalism pioneered by Schwartz and Seabrooke (2008). On the policy front, I attempt to construct an ordinal index to measure the Gap in the Accommodation Supplement Promise (GASP) for use as a policy instrument for the government in future. The premise being the crucial importance of efficiently structured housing policy tools that are critical in an environment witnessing rapid residential capitalism with falling homeownership and an increasing reliance on a rental market.