The presence of nearby public facility contributes to real-estateís value, thatís why the market may expect impact of public project on houseís price. But undesirable and semi-desirable facility location choices can be contested by close inhabitants, because they are source of negative externalities or negative expectations. In suburban zones of Parisís agglomeration, the oppositions to these infrastructures become frequent, and an official projectís announce does not mean automatically its implementation. Through 3 study cases, and with data from the Paris Chamber of Notary, we explore the way the expectation mechanism is affected by juridical conflicts driven by close inhabitants. We suppose that the process depends on the to-be-realized-chance of the project. As the conflict activities amplify or reduce the certainty on the new facilityís arrival, marketís perception on the infrastructure varies among the different periods of conflicts. The variation is captured by our hedonic model.